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Terrorism and Game Theory: From 
the Terrorists’ Point of View 
Kevin Chlebik*
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the interplay between two distinct terrorist cells 
of the same terrorist organization using game-theoretic models.  It will 
discuss the economic consequences of terrorism and provide a literature 
review.  Much of the available literature focuses on national policies and the 
effects such policies have on terrorists’ behavior.  The approach taken here 
differs in that the primary focus is on terrorists’ behavior.  By studying 
decisions terrorists make and understanding why they make them, better 
counterterrorism policies can be developed. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon (9/11) marked a watershed moment in world history.  This 
unprecedented and unprovoked attack shook the American public and 
affected international markets.  Despite the absence of 9/11-style attacks in 
recent years, terrorists still exist and want nothing less than to inflict mass 
casualties on Americans.  In the words of Al Qaeda spokesman Suleiman 
Abu Gheith: 
We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4 
million Americans—2 million of them children—and to exile twice 
as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.  
Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and 
biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that 
have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical 
and biological weapons.1
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To accomplish this feat, terrorists continually improve their techniques, 
competing with one another to see who can execute the next 9/11.2
Economic tools can be applied to understand the root causes of terrorism 
so that future tragedies are averted.  One of the economic tools used to 
analyze terrorist activity is game theory.  Game-theoretic models are ideal 
for capturing the essence of interaction between terrorists and 
counterterrorism agencies.  Such models elucidate terrorists’ motivations by 
considering the decisions they encounter.  Numerous papers focus on the 
decisions of nation-states and the reactions of terrorists; however, few, if 
any, papers focus on the decisions of terrorists and the corresponding 
reactions of nation-states.  The purpose of this paper is to develop game-
theoretic models to illustrate possible scenarios terrorist cells encounter.  
Terrorist cells are active players in these models, and nation-states are 
passive players responding with either changes in military allocation from 
opposing states or terrorist reinforcement from supporting states.  
Understanding the interactions described within these models is essential for 
developing better counterterrorism policies. 
“Terrorism” is a difficult word to define, in part because deeming an act 
“terrorism” depends subjectively on whether a person sides with the 
attackers or their victims.3  One definition of “terrorism is the premeditated 
use, or threat of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective 
through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience.”4  A key part of 
this definition is the political objective, without which similar attacks would 
be considered merely criminal.5  Another critical part of this definition is 
extranormal violence.6  Terrorists continually try “to outdo one another 
[with increasingly severe atrocities] in their competition for publicity, 
funding, recruits, and contacts.”7  For example, a street mugging perpetrated 
by an individual upset about government policies leading to the outsourcing 
of his job does not constitute terrorism. 
Much of the literature using economic tools to analyze terrorist behavior 
focuses on the interplay between nations.  This paper develops game-
theoretic models focusing on the interactions between two separate terrorist 
cells who are members of the same terrorist organization.  Before 
developing these models, this paper presents an overview of the 
consequences of terrorist attacks and a review of the literature that discusses 
how game theory can be used to study terrorism. 
II.  ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM 
In 2002, the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress described 
the costs of terrorism as the loss of human and nonhuman capital, 
uncertainty in consumer and investor behavior, retrenchment in specific 
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industries or localities, increased costs of security (“terrorist tax”), and anti-
terrorist expenditures crowding out more productive activity.8
Terrorist attacks take lives and destroy infrastructure.  Besides the actual 
loss of life, the economy suffers from a loss in productivity associated with 
that life.  The loss of infrastructure includes not only the property destroyed, 
but also cleanup and repair costs.9  In addition, after a terrorist attack 
markets experience increased volatility and increased risk premiums due to 
public fear.10  Demand decreases for risky assets and increases for safe 
assets as investors safeguard themselves from this increased volatility.11  
Generally when consumption and investment decline, it adversely affects the 
stock market.12  Furthermore, some industries, such as airlines, tourism, and 
casinos, carry a disproportionate amount of the negative burdens associated 
with a terrorist attack.13  Localities heavily associated with these industries, 
such as Detroit and Las Vegas, are affected as well.14
After a terrorist attack, security tightens as businesses safeguard 
themselves against another attack.  The indirect costs for this increase in 
security are distributed throughout society in the form of travel delays, 
higher insurance, increased shipping costs, and slower mail deliveries.15  
The inefficiencies associated with this “terrorist tax” create a negative 
supply shock to all production.16  Furthermore, there are declines in real 
rental on capital, productivity, and potential growth rates.17
Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal describe decreased Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) as another cost of terrorism.18  Countries 
experiencing high levels of terrorism also experience lower returns on 
investment, resulting in a decrease in the stock of foreign investments.19  
Abadie and Gardeazabal write that although terrorism contributes to only a 
small portion of a country’s economic risk, the effect on FDI is magnified.20  
For example, the 9/11 attack caused a 0.06% loss in total productive assets 
for the US economy, but from 2000 to 2003 FDI inflows decreased from 
15.8% to 1.5% of the gross fixed capital formation in the U.S.21
III.  GAME THEORY AS A MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING TERRORIST 
BEHAVIOR 
Because of the interactions between terrorists and counterterrorism 
agencies, game theory is an ideal tool for understanding terrorist behavior.  
For example, the high number of airplane hijackings in the 1970s caused 
airports to increase their use of metal detectors, therefore increasing the 
relative cost of hijackings for terrorists.22  As a result, terrorists switched 
from hijackings to kidnappings.23  The high number of kidnappings caused 
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governments to increase security measures for foreign diplomats, so 
terrorists replaced kidnappings with suicide bombings.24
Game theory can also be used to dictate policy for future events.  
Harvey Lapan and Todd Sandler use a simple model to describe when and if 
a government should concede to terrorist demands.25  The common 
government policy, and one of the four pillars of U.S. terrorism policy, is 
“no concessions to terrorists.”  However, Lapan and Sandler note this policy 
is optimal only if governments adhere to it and terrorists have incomplete 
information regarding government credibility.26
Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce use game theory to describe what they 
call a “deterrence race” between two countries.27  If the home country 
increases domestic deterrence efforts, the terrorists’ costs associated with 
attacking the home country increase.28  This poses a negative externality on 
the foreign country because the relative cost for terrorists to attack the 
foreign country decreases.29  As a result, the foreign country must also 
increase deterrence efforts or face an increased likelihood of being 
attacked.30  When the foreign country increases deterrence efforts, the home 
country must reciprocate because they now face an increased likelihood of 
being attacked since the foreign country is now more secure.31  The 
reiterative nature of this scenario causes countries to overspend on 
deterrence efforts.32  Sandler and Arce go on to describe how information 
sharing between the home and foreign countries can exacerbate the dilemma 
if deterrence efforts are not coordinated.33
Sandler and Arce also illustrate the advantage of cooperation through a 
game-theoretic model that uses two countries and a terrorist group to show a 
prisoner’s dilemma.34  In this model both countries, without cooperation, 
choose to deter terrorists, although the optimal choice is for both countries to 
cooperate and preempt.35  Sandler and Arce investigate other scenarios 
where the desired outcome is contingent on both countries acting together.36  
For example, when the goal is for the allied countries to freeze terrorist 
assets, the desired outcome is achieved only when both countries choose to 
freeze assets.37  If only one country freezes assets, the terrorists will divert 
their assets to the other country.38  This scenario is a “weakest link” game.39  
Another scenario considered involves intelligence gathering and sharing.40  
If both countries infiltrate the same terrorist organization, not only are their 
efforts redundant, but they increase the risk of being discovered.41
 
IV.  MODELS 
Much of the game theory literature focuses on games where terrorists 
are passive players, meaning that terrorist actions are determined by the 
active decisions of other players.  The aim of this paper is to develop models 
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where terrorists are active players and nations, whether supporting or 
opposing terrorists, are passive players.  Developing such models will 
provide insight into terrorist behavior and lead to useful counterterrorism 
policy recommendations. 
These models assume a decentralized terrorist organization where cells 
act independently.  The two active players in these models (Α and Β) are 
distinct factions of the same terrorist group.  Al Qaeda is a perfect example 
because Al Qaeda “has been moving towards decentralization ever since the 
invasion of Afghanistan, with isolated cells and loosely affiliated groups that 
have only a tenuous connection to the greater [Al Qaeda] hierarchy tapping 
into Bin Laden’s ‘franchise,’ appropriating its ideological ‘brand name’ for 
their actions.”42  According to some experts, “Al Qaeda has autonomous 
underground cells in some [one hundred] countries,” and has become 
“increasingly reliant on sympathetic affiliates” of other terrorist 
organizations.43  These models also include two types of passive players, 
supporting and opposing nations.  Supporting nations provide resources to 
terrorist cells based on each cell’s relative merit.  The opposing nations, 
whom the terrorists attack, determine military allocations based on terrorist 
activity.
FIGURE 1:  SIMPLE GAME WITH TWO TERRORIST CELLS 
  Β 
  Attack Do Not Attack 
Attack 5,5 4,1 
Α 
Do Not Attack 1,4 0,0 
 
The model shown in Figure 1 illustrates a game with two options for the 
terrorist cells, “attack” or “do not attack”.  In this game, an attack is assumed 
to succeed.  The terrorists’ net payout for an attack is +4, which includes +4 
pride points, +1 resource point from supporting nations, and a cost of -1 for 
resources spent.  The effect of a terrorist attack for the other cell is +1, which 
includes +2 pride points because they are members of the same team, and -1 
resource point because supporting nations regard the attacking cell with 
higher merit and reallocate their support, taking away funds from the passive 
cell.  The dominant strategy in this game is for both cells to attack.  When 
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attacking, a terrorist cell experiences a net utility increase of +4 because 5 > 
1 and 4 > 0 (see Figure 1). 
To develop a model accounting for the possibility of failed attacks, 
Figure 2 shows the short-term change in military allocation for the opposing 
nation based on the actions of the two terrorist cells.  mΑ represents the 
percentage of the military used to suppress cell Α, and mΒ represents the 
percentage of the military used to suppress cell Β.  This model assumes the 
opposing nation dedicates its available military force solely to suppress the 
two terrorist cells so that mΑ + mΒ = 1.  Adhering to the game theory 
convention where players try to maximize their payoffs, the values in Figure 
2 are all between -1 and 0 inclusive, so that a terrorist cell receiving 100% of 
the opposing nation’s military attention has a payoff of -1 and a terrorist cell 
receiving 0% of the opposing nation’s military attention has a payoff of 0. 
When both cells attack, the opposing nation does not change its military 
allocations.  Also, when both cells do nothing military allocations do not 
change.  When one cell attacks and the other does nothing, the attacking cell 
(ΔmΑ or ΔmΒ) attracts increased military attention lowering that cell’s 
payoff.  The non-attacking cell experiences an equal decrease in military 
attention, which increases its payoff (see Figure 2).  Because this model 
represents the short-term, the opposing nation cannot change its overall 
military strength with reinforcements or withdrawals. 
FIGURE 2:  OPPOSING NATION’S SHORT-TERM MILITARY ALLOCATION FOR 
TWO TERRORIST CELLS 
  Β 
  Attack Do Not Attack 
Attack −mΑ, −mΒ −mΑ – ΔmΑ, –mΒ + ΔmΑ
Α 
Do Not 
Attack −mΑ + ΔmΒ, −mΒ − ΔmΒ −mΑ, −mΒ
 
The dominant strategy for both cells in this game is “do not attack”.  To 
see this, consider when both cells attack.  Either cell can improve its payoff 
by not attacking (−mΑ + ΔmΒ > −mΑ or –mΒ + ΔmΑ > −mΒ) and when a cell 
decides not to attack, the attacking cell experiences a decrease in payoff 
(−mΑ – ΔmΑ < −mΑ or −mΒ − ΔmΒ < −mΒ).  If this cell also decides not to 
attack, payoffs change back to “attack, attack” payoffs (−mΑ or −mB).  
Because a cell improves its payoff by not attacking, or at least does no 
worse, regardless of how the other cell plays, “do not attack” is the dominant 
B
[Vol. III: 15, 2010] Terrorism and Game Theory 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW 
21 
strategy for both cells leading to a Nash equilibrium of “do not attack, do not 
attack”. 
In the long-term the opposing nation can change the total military force, 
used to suppress the terrorist cells, with reinforcements or withdrawals.  
Considering the size of the opposing nation’s military strength and 
allocation among terrorist cells is important because there is a difference in a 
cell receiving 100% of the attention from a small platoon as opposed to 50% 
of the attention from an entire battalion.  Figure 3 illustrates a long-term 
model similar to Figure 2, where Μ represents the opposing nation’s military 
strength as a fraction of their total military strength (0 ≤ Μ ≤ 1).  In this 
model, any change in the opposing nation’s military strength affects both 
cells because of their proximity to one another.  Any terrorist attack causes 
an increase in Μ, represented by ΔΜ.  When both cells refrain from 
attacking Μ decreases, which is represented by −ΔΜ.  Similar to the model 
in Figure 2, the optimal strategy for both cells in Figure 3 is “do not attack.” 
Changes in total military strength described in Figure 3 are consistent 
with the cyclical nature of terrorism and counterterrorism, as described by 
Joao Faria.44  The cyclical nature of terrorist attacks is a result of cause and 
effect.  When enforcement is low Μ is small, therefore terrorists have lower 
costs associated with terrorist activities, and terrorist attacks increase.  In 
response, governments increase their level of enforcement and Μ increases, 
which increases the costs to terrorists and effectively decreases the level of 
terrorist activities.  After the frequency of terrorist attacks declines, 
governments have less incentive to invest in enforcement, so Μ decreases 
and the cycle repeats itself.  These terror cycles are similar to predator-prey 
models described in ecology and biology. 
FIGURE 3:  OPPOSING NATION’S LONG-TERM MILITARY ALLOCATION FOR 
TWO TERRORIST CELLS 
  Β 
  Attack Do Not Attack 
Attack −(Μ + ΔΜ) * mΑ, −(Μ + ΔΜ) * mΒ
−(Μ + ΔΜ)(mΑ + ΔmΑ), 
−(Μ + ΔΜ)(mΒ − ΔmΑ) 
Α 
Do Not 
Attack 
−(Μ + ΔΜ)(mΑ − ΔmΒ), 
−(Μ + ΔΜ)(mΒ + ΔmΒ) 
−(Μ − ΔΜ) * mΑ, 
−(Μ − ΔΜ) * mΒ
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Combining the long-term model for military strength and allocation with 
the initial model, where attacks always succeed, creates a model that 
considers the possibility of failed attacks.  As an intermediate model that 
does not consider the opposing nation’s military strength, Figure 4 shows the 
payoffs associated with unsuccessful attacks.  This model will be 
generalized and considered in an expected value formula for the final model. 
FIGURE 4: PAYOFFS WITH UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK POSSIBILITY 
  Β 
  Successful Attack 
Do Not 
Attack 
Unsuccessful 
Attack 
Successful Attack 5,5 4,1 3,-5 
Do Not Attack 1,4 0,0 -1,-6 Α 
Unsuccessful 
Attack -5,3 -6,-1 -7,-7 
 
Successful attacks retain the same payoffs as in Figure 1.  Unsuccessful 
attacks result in -6 for the attacking cell: -4 shame points, -1 resource point 
because the cell loses merit in the eyes of the supporting nation, and -1 point 
for resources spent.  An unsuccessful attack also gives the other cell -1 
point: -2 shame points and +1 resource point since the supporting nation 
views this cell relatively more favorable than the unsuccessful cell. 
The likelihood of a terrorist attack being successful depends on the 
military strength of the opposing nation.  Figure 5 generalizes the previous 
model, with Μ * mΤ representing the opposing nation’s military strength and 
allocation dedicated to preventing terrorist cell Τ (either Α or Β).  This 
multiplier does two things.  First, if mΑ > mΒ then for a fixed Μ the 
multiplier indicates more military attention to cell Α than cell Β.  Second, for 
fixed mΑ and mΒ, a larger Μ indicates more military attention to both 
terrorist cells.  The terrorists’ probability of success p equals the attack’s 
success rate without opposition multiplied by (1 − Μ * mΤ).  Using this 
probability, the expected value of an attacking cell is: V = p(pride + 
resources) + (1 – p)(shame – resources).  The expected value for the other 
cell is: v = p(pride free ride – resources) + (1 − p)(shame externality + 
resources).  In this model C represents the resource cost for attacking. 
[Vol. III: 15, 2010] Terrorism and Game Theory 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW 
23 
FIGURE 5:  GENERALIZED GAME BETWEEN TWO TERRORIST CELLS 
  B 
  Attack Do Not Attack 
Attack V – C + v, V – C + v V – C, v 
A 
Do Not 
Attack v, V – C 0,0 
 
In this game the Nash equilibrium depends on the values for V and C.  If 
V > C, the dominant strategy for each cell is to attack, leading to the Nash 
equilibrium “attack, attack”.  To see this, one must start by looking at the 
“do not attack, do not attack” scenario.  Because V > C and V –C > 0, it is 
therefore advantageous for a cell to attack.  Furthermore, because V – C + v 
> v, it is advantageous for the other cell to attack as well.  Hence when V > 
C, both cells can be expected to attack.  Conversely, when V < C the 
dominant strategy for each cell is to not attack.  To see this, one must start 
by looking at the “attack, attack” scenario.  Because V < C and V – C < 0, it 
is therefore advantageous for a cell to not attack because v > V – C +v.  For 
the other cell, 0 > V − C, therefore making it advantageous for them not to 
attack either.  An interesting scenario occurs when V = C in that all four 
possibilities are Nash equilibria because each cell’s payoff depends solely on 
the other cell’s action, not its own (see Figure 6). 
FIGURE 6: GENERALIZED GAME BETWEEN TWO TERRORIST CELLS         
WHEN V = C 
  Β 
  Attack Do Not Attack 
Attack v, v 0, v 
Α 
Do Not 
Attack v, 0 0,0 
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V.  REMARKS 
At first glance, the implications of these models seem intuitive.  The 
opposing nation can decrease the probability of a successful terrorist attack 
(p) by increasing its military strength.  In addition, the equation V = p(pride 
+ resources) + (1 – p)(shame – resources) implies the opposing nation can 
decrease cells’ utility for attacks by decreasing resources given by 
supporting nations, decreasing cells’ pride felt for successful attacks, or 
increasing cells’ shame from unsuccessful attacks (see Figure 5).  In short, to 
decrease the frequency of terrorist attacks these models suggest increasing 
military strength to intercept resources from supporting nations and lower 
terrorist cells’ attack success probabilities, as well as increasing “soft power” 
tactics to alter the pride and shame felt by terrorist cells and deter supporting 
nations from providing cells with resources. 
The question is which of these counterterrorism strategies, increasing 
military strength or increasing “soft power” tactics, is more effective.  The 
answer depends on the elasticity of p, pride, shame, and resources.  For a 
simplistic example, in the equation: V = p(pride + resources) + (1 – 
p)(shame – resources), would a $1 trillion investment be better spent 
increasing p, or collectively decreasing pride and resources while increasing 
shame?  If the investment would increase p by 20% or decrease pride and 
resources by 25% while also increasing shame by 25%, the investment 
would be better spent on “soft power” tactics because such investment 
would lower V more than investing in military strength.  Similarly, if the 
investment would increase p by 30% or decrease pride and resources by 
25% while increasing shame by 25%, the investment would be better spent 
on military strength. 
Determining the elasticity of such factors is beyond the scope of this 
paper and could be the subject of future research.  Future research might also 
investigate the effects of increased military strength on terrorists’ attack 
opportunities–whether the probability of a successful terrorist attack 
increases or decreases when available targets increase, and whether or not 
this effect changes from the short-run to the long-run.  The purpose of this 
paper is to offer reasons why the study of terrorism is important, provide a 
review of previous studies, and develop game-theoretic models from the 
terrorists’ point of view.  These models are far from complete, but they do 
provide insights into the interplay between terrorists and nation-states.  The 
importance of terrorism studies is evident, and with further research, better 
policies can be implemented to mitigate the effects of terrorism. 
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